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 Dominic Heinz 
A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
Added Value or Structurally Deficient? 
Introduction* 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union (SU) marked the end of the way the 
international political system had been organized since 1945. New states 
emerged and the foreign policies of the European states and Russia had to 
be readjusted.
1 Since one of the hitherto existing two superpowers col-
lapsed, the remaining superpower was by default predominant in the inter-
national system. In the Western hemisphere, the dominant position of the 
United States (US) had been unchallenged during the Cold War and re-
mained unchallenged after the Cold War.
2 After the dissolution of the SU 
and after the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, Russia and the EU devel-
oped several institutions and policies (f. i. the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement which will be discussed later in detail) to express their foreign 
policy positions. These institutions and policies are analysed as endogenous 
 
*  A previous version of the text had been accepted 2004 in the program „Interna-
tional Master of Arts in Russian Studies“ at the European University at St. Peters-
burg as master thesis. I am grateful to comments of all participants and to my 
advisors Nikita Lomagin and Vadim Volkov. Special thanks to Martin Schaffartzik 
and to staff at ZEI. The work was supported by the Mannheim Centre for European 
Social Research (MZES). 
1   Crockatt R., 1997, The End of the Cold War, in: Baylis, John / Smith, Steve (eds.), 
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2   Mastanduno, M., 1997, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US 
Grand Strategy after the Cold War, in: International Security 21 (4), 63. Dominic Heinz 
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issues in the first part of the paper for the EU and in the second part for 
Russia. However, they evolved and changed in the process of finding solu-
tions for international conflicts and crises that forced the EU and Russia to 
cooperate. These conflicts and crises are analysed as exogenous issues to 
EU-Russian relations in the third part of the paper. The energy dialogue, 
the status of Kosovo and the situation in Chechnya are considered as case 
studies for EU-Russian relations in this paper. It concludes that there is no 
clear-cut answer to the question if EU-Russian relations brought added 
value or were rather useless. The energy dialogue is a good example that 
shows that the EU-Russian relation can bring added value. On the other 
hand, the example of the status of Kosovo shows EU-Russian relations as 
redundant. With regard to the situation in Chechnya, both interpretations 
are possible. At the beginning of the conflict in Chechnya, Russia and the 
EU accused each other of violating human rights and interference in do-
mestic Russian affairs, respectively. After 11 September 2001 Russia con-
sidered the conflict in Chechnya not as domestic any more, so that EU-
Russian relations facilitated humanitarian assistance instead of mutual ac-
cusations.  
1. Endogenous Issues of the EU 
Let us start with EU-Russian relations during the Cold War. When the EU 
was still the European Community (EC), its legal basis were the Treaties of 
Rome which established the European Community and included the 
EURATOM-Treaty and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
The names of these treaties tell us that they had little to do with foreign pol-
icy in general, and they had nothing to do with the relations to the SU in 
particular. From a Soviet point of view, the EC was the economic branch of 
NATO.
3 Perestroika and glasnost changed this situation. One result was 
that the EC acknowledged the existence of the Council on Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA) and established relations with it in 1986. More-
over, a Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1989. 
 
3   Pinder, J., 1991, The European Community and Eastern Europe, London: Royal 
Institute for International Affairs and Pinter Publishers, 8-36. A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, 
the SU was no longer seen as a threat, especially after it cooperated with 
the West in the Gulf War in 1991. It was the dissolution of the SU in De-
cember 1991 which made EC member states concerned about the security 
situation. The EC/EU were caught by surprise by this development. At the 
time, the EU agenda was preoccupied with the accession of Austria, Swe-
den and Finland. Adequate concepts within the EU to handle the security 
situation were lacking. 
Europe’s reaction towards the crisis of Soviet dissolution depended on 
whether or not the ex-Soviet states were considered eligible for full mem-
bership in the EU. With the states eligible for membership, the so-called 
Europe Agreements were signed, that stated that the state concerned would 
eventually become a full member of the EU. The exact date of accession 
would depend on how long it would take the state to adopt the acquis 
communautaire. 
The fragile situation in the Balkans was another development that made the 
European states think about security issues. The wars in Bosnia and Kos-
ovo indicated that there were good reasons to do so. At the time the eastern 
border of Germany was the eastern border of the EU. The developments in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were expected to affect Germany before 
other West European states would be concerned. During that time the Ger-
man efforts were devoted to the task of minimizing the risks and maximiz-
ing the chances of the development in its south-eastern periphery. The 
efforts did not only remain in the realm of German national foreign policy. 
The mechanism of enlargement was designed as a mechanism to export 
stability to the neighbouring regions. This holds true for the enlargement of 
the EU as well as of NATO. 
With other former states of the SU that were not eligible for full EU mem-
bership, the so-called Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) were 
concluded. In 1992, negotiations for a PCA with Russia began and in 1994, 
an agreement was drafted and signed. Due to the first Chechen war, which Dominic Heinz 
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was heavily criticized by the EU, it took three years until the PCA entered 
into force in 1997.
4  
In the meantime, an Interim Agreement was concluded. The document is of 
a rather technical character. It primarily deals with trade relations between 
the EU and Russia. In this document, the EU allows Russia to entertain 
special commercial relations with the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). In exchange, Russia commits itself to the opening of the na-
tional market for foreign enterprises and to abolish all obstacles that con-
strain trade between Russia and the EU. The Interim Agreement has to be 
seen in the light of the GATT membership negotiations of Russia and the 
EU that began in 1993. However, in the aftermath of the war in Chechnya 
and the financial crisis in 1998, Russia did not stick to the commitment it 
had made and did not abolish trade restrictions.
 5  
The first paper of the EU mentioning a common view of the European 
heads of state and government towards Russia was adopted at the European 
Council in Madrid in 1995.
6 The EU feared that Russia might not manage 
the transition to a Western style economy (and society).
 7 Additionally, for 
the first time the notion of soft security challenges like nuclear safety and 
environmental protection occurred in the Madrid text.
8 When the PCA fi-
nally entered into force in 1997, it granted Russia access to the internal 
market of the EU and committed Russia to democracy and human rights. 
 
4   Partnership and Cooperation Agreement see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_ 
243.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
5   Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade Related Matters between the EU and the 
Russian Federation, Moscow: Delegation of the European Commission to the Rus-
sian Federation, EU Series Nr. 2 Working Paper, December 1994, and the protocol 
attached to the Interim Agreement.  
6   Herrberg, A., 1998, The European Union and Russia: Towards a New Ostpolitik?, 
in: Rhodes, Carolyn (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, London: 
Lynne Rieder, 98-99.   
7   Leshukov, I., 1998, Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Inte-
gration, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) Discussion Paper C 
26, 17. 
8   Haukkala, H., 2003, The Clash of Boundaries? The European Union and Russia in 
the Northern Dimension, in: Lehti, Marko / Smith, David (eds.), Re-inventing 
Europe: Nordic and Baltic Experience in Post Cold War Identity Politics, London: 
Frank Cass. A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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Another foreign policy instrument of the EU was the establishment of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992.
9 In this treaty, the member states declared the CFSP as a separate pil-
lar of the EU with two foreign policy instruments. First, the Common Ac-
tion, which allows e.g. the appointment of a special envoy or observer 
team, and second, the Common Standpoint, which is supposed to facilitate 
coherent behaviour of EU member states in international organizations. In 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, a third foreign policy instrument, called Com-
mon Strategy, was added in 1997.
10 Furthermore, the position of a High 
Representative was created in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The national for-
eign policies towards countries or regions should align with each other 
within a Common Strategy. 
Under the German presidency of the EU in the first half of 1999, a Com-
mon Strategy towards Russia was formulated and adopted in June 1999 at 
the Cologne European Council. Along with the Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreement, the Common Strategy on Russia forms the political basis 
for EU-Russia relations. In October 1999, Russia demonstrated the key im-
portance it attaches to its relationship with the EU by adopting its own 
strategy towards the EU, covering the period until 2010.
11 
The political dialogue developed under the PCA aims at the establishment 
of closer economic and political links, the support of Russia’s transition to 
a market economy, the enhancement of Russia’s democratic institutions, 
respect for human rights and the establishment of new forms of consulta-
tion and cooperation to promote international security.
12 Topics discussed 
in the framework of the political dialogue include internal developments in 
the EU and Russia (such as EU enlargement, the European Convention, 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the reform process in 
Russia). Also, opportunities for cooperation in the resolution of interna-
 
9   Title V of the Treaty of the EU. See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/ 
a19000.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
10  Amendment to Title V of the Treaty of the EU and the new Article 26 (ex Article J 
16). See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s50000.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
11  See http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_245.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
12  EU Common Strategy on Russia, see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_244.htm 
last accessed on 21.08.2007. Dominic Heinz 
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tional crises (including the Middle East, Western Balkans, Afghanistan and 
Moldova/Trans-Dniestr) were discussed.
13 The fight against terrorism and 
the war in Iraq has gained momentum in the discussions. The political dia-
logue also provides an opportunity to discuss questions on which ap-
proaches may diverge, such as the Chechen conflict.  
As far as security cooperation is concerned, the new development in the 
ESDP has added a new dimension in the strategic partnership between the 
EU and Russia. Launched in 1999, the ESDP aims to provide the EU with 
the civilian and military capabilities necessary for the conduct of a wide 
range of humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations, 
often referred to as “Petersberg tasks”.
14 Since its inception, ESDP has 
been open to the participation of like-minded partners of the EU (interna-
tional organizations, non-EU NATO members and EU candidate countries, 
as well as key partners like Russia) in EU-led humanitarian, peace-keeping 
and peace-enforcement operations. Russia contributed to the first EU-led 
operation, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which be-
came operational on 1 January 2003. Discussions are also underway to ex-
plore prospects for Russia’s possible contribution of capabilities to future 
ESDP operations.
15 
In 2003, the EU addressed challenges posed by proximity and neighbour-
hood.
16 In practical terms, the initiative is aimed at working with 
neighbouring countries towards improving conditions for the free move-
ment of goods, services, capital and persons as well as developing a zone of 
prosperity and friendly neighbourhood. As part of this new policy, the 
Commission envisaged the creation of new mechanisms for dealing with 
the common challenges arising from proximity-related issues on the exter-
 
13  Ehrhard, H., 2002, What Model for CFSP?, Chaillot Paper 55, Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies of the European Union, 10-23. 
14  Treaty of the European Union. Article 17.  
15  Lynch, D., 2003, Russia faces Europe, Chaillot Paper 60, Paris: Institute for Secu-
rity Studies of the European Union, 54-82.  
16   Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 
COM(2003)104 final. A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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nal borders of the enlarged EU.
17 Since the beginning of 2007, this policy is 
officially managed via the European Neighbourhood and Partnership In-
strument (ENPI) which supports cross-border and regional or trans-national 
cooperation along the external borders, combining both external policy ob-
jectives and economic and social cohesion.
18 
Russia reacted with reservations to the concept of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP), because it thought that the instrument would not be 
adequate for EU-Russian relations and feared that it could threaten further 
ties with CIS countries. In November 2003, both sides agreed to decouple 
Russia from the ENP and to develop a strategic partnership including four 
common spaces (1. Economic Space, 2. Space of Freedom, Security and 
Justice 3. External Security, 4. Research, Education and Culture).  
The agreement concerning the four common spaces should have been 
signed earlier in 2004. But then, the manipulated presidential elections in 
Ukraine led to a deterioration of EU-Russian relations. Moscow supported 
the pro-Russian candidate while the EU (above all Poland and the Baltic 
States) supported the so-called “orange revolution”. Finally, the agreement 
was signed in 2005, but the controversy about Ukraine pointed to a more 
substantial disagreement concerning the transformation process in ENP 
states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). In 
most of these states, Russia supports incumbent pro-Russian but mostly 
undemocratic regimes. 
2. Endogenous Issues in Russia 
The president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Ministry of 
Defence (MO) conduct Russian foreign policy. Article 86 of the Russian 
constitution attributes the competence for foreign policy directly to the 
 
17  Commission of the European Communities, Paving the way for a New Neighbour-
hood Instrument, COM (2003) 393 final. See at http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/ 
p_522.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
18  Marchetti, A., 2006, The European Neighbourhood Policy. Foreign Policy at the 
EU’s Periphery, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) Discussion 
Paper C 158. Dominic Heinz 
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president.
19 President Boris Yeltsin paid only sporadic attention towards 
foreign affairs. This was partly due to internal conflicts and partly due to 
his health problems. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, this has 
changed significantly. The same holds true for the role of the MID. Be-
tween the years 1993 and 1996 the MID had a weak position in formulating 
foreign policy, because of three factors, namely the political weakness of 
Andrei Kozyrev as the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, the lack of 
interest of the president is the second factor and finally, the MO’s strong 
influence on security policy under Minister Pavel Grachev. 
In general, the lack of human resources and administrative capacities con-
strained the coordination within and between the ministries. A significant 
step  towards consistency in the decision making process for foreign policy 
was the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov and the dismissal of Pavel 
Grachev in 1996. Additionally, the MO was entrusted with the task of mili-
tary reforms. That created free space until 1998 for the MID to formulate 
foreign policy by itself and not only to execute the policy of the MO.  
In the years 1998 to 2000, Russian foreign policy again became more lim-
ited due to the financial crisis in Russia. Within this period of time, the po-
litical leadership defined the position of Russia in the world as a regional 
power, a world power and a nuclear power. This status was assumed to be 
grounded in Russia’s geographic vastness, strategic interests and nuclear 
capabilities.
20 In retrospective, Russia tried to emphasize the perceived 
strong points of its Soviet heritage. But there were also some weak points 
in the heritage of the SU that were not perceived in the same manner. 
Among these were the problems that stemmed from the economic and po-
litical transitions. On Russia’s path to market economy, the state was not 
able to provide transaction costs, like collecting taxes, enforcing contract 
and protecting private property rights. However, since private property was 
created firstly through the voucher programme and secondly through the 
state privatization policy, these transaction costs were necessary for a func-
 
19  See www.constitution.ru last accessed on the 21.08.2007. 
20  Aron, L., 1998, Foreign Policy Doctrine of Post Communist Russia, in: Mandel-
baum, Michael (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, Washington: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 27. A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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tioning market. The result was that the state administration became increas-
ingly corrupt and that non-state actors took over the transaction cost pro-
viding functions. Against this background, Russian foreign policy concepts 
from 1993 to 2000 tried to push the notion of a multi-polar world.  
Especially during Yevgeni Primakov’s term of office as Minister for For-
eign Affairs, this notion was promoted very strongly.
21 The multi-polar 
world view entailed an emphasis on the importance of international institu-
tions, like the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). The problem was, however, that the international political 
system was not as multi-polar as Russia had hoped. Instead, it was domi-
nated by the US-led western alliance. In 1999, Boris Yeltsin appointed 
Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister. Vladimir Putin was elected new presi-
dent of Russia in 2000. During the election campaign, he announced the 
strategy of a “dictatorship of law”. After his election, Vladimir Putin 
brought a huge number of independent players like powerful businessmen 
and regional leaders under his control or forced them to leave the country. 
An important case in point of this were the actions against the oil company 
YUKOS.  
In Europe and North America there were different perceptions of Putin’s 
“dictatorship of law”.
22 On the one hand, there was a more pessimistic view 
that emphasized the decline of democratic values and practices, especially 
visible during the parliamentary election in 2003. The assassinations of the 
journalist Anna Politkowskaja and the former spy Alexander Litvinenko 
fuelled again doubts on Russia’s transition to democracy and rule of law. 
The coincidence has to be noted that since the announcement of the “dicta-
torship of law”, every major opposition to the Kremlin in Russia had disap-
peared.
23 
 
21   Primakov, Y., 1996, Na Goizonte – Mnogopolusnij Mir, in: Mezshdunarodnaya 
Zshizn’ 10, 3-13. 
22  Rahr, A., 2004, Der Kalte Frieden. Putins Russland und der Westen, in: Internatio-
nale Politik 3, 1-10. 
23  Gelman, V., 2005, Political Opposition in Russia. Is it Becoming Extinct?, in: Rus-
sian Politics and Law 43 (3), 25-50. Dominic Heinz 
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On the other hand, there was a more positive view that stresses the prosper-
ity of the Russian economy. Behind this was the hope that a democratic 
modernization will follow after the economic modernization. 
The election of Vladimir Putin had to be seen in the light of the second 
Chechen war and the financial crisis of 1998 that, as mentioned above, 
brought the process of state erosion to its culmination. Therefore, since the 
foreign policy of Russia is subordinated directly to the President, the 
change from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin had direct implications for the 
foreign policy behaviour of Russia. Thus, it seems justified to say that it is 
largely due to Vladimir Putin’s personal impact that Russia disregarded the 
OSCE and underlined the primacy of the UN Security Council. 
As Russia experienced weakness in the 1990s it tried not to get involved in 
international crises after the year 2000. This forced Russia to adopt a prag-
matic approach to every single issue that arises like the handling of the war 
on terror and the war in Iraq.
24 As a result, Russia has to perform a perma-
nent balancing act between its economic needs and foreign policy inter-
ests.
25 Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and especially since 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Middle East has become ever more 
instable.
26 The political climate for Middle Eastern gas and oil exports to 
the EU thus has deteriorated as well.
27 Therefore, Russia has become more 
attractive as an alternative supplier of oil and gas to the EU. Russia’s 
pragmatic foreign policy is designed in such a way that if the EU institu-
tions do not cooperate with Russia, then the bilateral ties of President 
Vladimir Putin with selected heads of state or government are employed as 
a means of enforcing Russian interests. Instead of relying on legal agree-
ments and institutions, personal relationships serve as the basis for political 
 
24  Danilow, D., 2004, Russlands Interessen. Pragmatismus und Suche nach Balancen, 
in: Internationale Politik 3, 11-17. 
25  Puskov, A., 2000, Rossija v novom miroporjadke: rjadom s zapadom ili sama po 
sebe?, in: Mezdunarodnaja zizn 10, 33-44.  
26  Karaganov, S., 2002, Putevoditel’ po sovremennomu miru, in: Rossija v global’noj 
politike 1, 7-8. 
27  Margelov, M., 2003, Probeda po ockam. Cto takoe pragmatizm vo vnesnej politi-
ke?, in: Rossija v global’noj politike 3, 8-16. A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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cooperation.
28 The relations between the Russian president and some Euro-
pean heads of state or government effectively constrain the institutions of 
the EU from implementing their policy. At the press conference after the 
EU-Russia summit in Rome 2003, Silvio Berlusconi endorsed the refusal of 
the Russian government to talk with Chechen separatists and the arrest of 
Michail Khodorkhovsky. This statement was diametrically opposed to the 
standpoint of the European Commission which had been supported by the 
EU member states before the summit.
29 In practice, the president of the 
Council forged an alliance with the president of Russia against the Euro-
pean Commission under its then president Romano Prodi, who later be-
came Berlusconi’s successor as Italian prime minister. Berlusconi’s 
manoeuvre happened during hard talks between the EU and Russia about 
contentious issues like the situation in Chechnya and anti-democratic prac-
tices in Russia. 
3. Exogenous Issues of EU-Russian Relations 
So far, we have reviewed the domestic or endogenous issues in Russia and 
the EU, but these are not the only issues influencing the relationship. Other 
policy issues that are external or exogenous to Russia and the EU have an 
impact on the relations as well. The delegation of the European commis-
sion to Russia names in total 18 areas of cooperation between Russia and 
the EU. In an alphabetical order these 18 areas of cooperation are: 1. Bank-
ing, Accounting and Audit reform / 2. Combating HIV and AIDS / 3. Cross 
border cooperation / 4. Culture / 5. Economics and Trade / 6. Energy / 7. 
Environment / 8. Foreign Policy and External Security / 9. Higher Educa-
tion / 10. Justice, Freedom and Security / 11. Kaliningrad / 12. North Cau-
casus / 13. Northern Dimension / 14. Regional Policy / 15. Science and 
Technology / 16. Space / 17. Transport / 18. Visas and Readmission.
30 For 
the purpose of this paper three case studies shall serve as examples for the 
 
28  Bordacev, T., 2003, Ob-ektivnoe poznanie Evropy, in: Rossia v global’noj politike 
4, 192-194. 
29   Miles, T., 2004, EU and Russia eye trade prize to smooth ties, Reuters on 
19.05.2004. Reproduced on Johnson’s Russia List Nr. 8215. 
30  See http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_211.htm last accessed on 10.10.2007. Dominic Heinz 
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18 areas of cooperation. Hence, only the energy dialogue, the situation in 
Chechnya and the status of Kosovo will be discussed. The selected cases 
originate from the areas energy, North Caucasus and Foreign Policy and 
External Security. Each of these case studies has played a decisive role dur-
ing the past decade and will continue to play an important role for both the 
EU and Russia. Regarding the remaining 15 areas of cooperation it is to 
note that the EU-Russian institutions and policies opened channels of com-
munication for the Northern Dimension, for Kaliningrad, for environment 
(e. g. signature of the Kyoto protocol) and for economics and trade (e. g. 
Russia’s access to the World Trade Organisation). Usually, the politically 
relevant and sensitive cases between the EU and Russia were and still are 
handled during the biannual EU-Russia summits. A concluding joint state-
ment is regularly issued to show the results of the discussions between the 
EU and Russia. Of course, those joint statements only exist since the first 
EU-Russia summit in the year 2000. Nevertheless, energy, North Caucasus 
and Foreign Policy and External Security played a more prominent role 
than any other area of cooperation. Therefore, case studies of these three 
areas are used as examples to review EU-Russian relations.
31 
The obvious reason for closer EU-Russian energy cooperation lie in the 
geographic proximity of the EU and Russia, the EU’s energy needs and 
Russia’s energy resources. Therefore, a close partnership is indispensable. 
In theory, a partnership is based on common values, common interests and 
mutual understanding.
32 The notion of equality between the partners is laid 
down in the Russian Middle term strategy towards the EU.
33 However, the 
differences between the EU and Russia are still considerable. The enlarged 
EU has 493 million inhabitants compared to the 143 million in Russia.
34  
 
31   A comprehensive list of documents related to the EU-Russian Summits can be 
found at http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_233.htm last accessed on 12.10.2007. 
32  Borko, Y., 2000, EU / Russia Co-operation: The Moscow Perspective, in: Baxen-
dale, James / Dewar, Stephan / Gowan, David (eds.), The EU and Kaliningrad: Ka-
liningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement, London: Federal Trust, 59-72. 
33  Paragraph 1.1. See http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_245.htm last accessed on 
21.08.2007. 
34  Vahl, M:, 2001, Just Good Friends? The EU – Russian Strategic Partnership and the 
Northern Dimension, Brussels: Center for European  Policy  Studies  (CEPS)     A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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The EU’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 14 times bigger than the GDP 
of Russia.
35 Since the EU and Russia have an interest to cooperate in the 
field of energy, a formal energy dialogue was established during the EU-
Russian Summit in Paris in 2000. Both parties agreed to enhance their co-
operation in the field of energy, because the European consumption of gas 
and oil will continue to increase while the European gas and oil extraction 
will decrease.
 36 Furthermore, after its enlargement the EU has to import 
even higher shares of Russian oil and gas, because the economies of the 
new member states are more dependent on fossil fuels than the old member 
states’ economies.
37  
At the same time, Russia is interested in technology to reduce energy con-
sumption and to modernize its infrastructure. Since the establishment of 
this energy dialogue, officials have met regularly and round tables have 
been organized. All these measures aim at providing a functioning market 
and at delivering security for energy supply. The energy dialogue has to be 
assessed as a very effective institution, because it has to reconcile a mo-
nopolized Russian energy market with strict European competition laws.  
However, the European Commission points out that Russia is using its en-
ergy policy not only to achieve economic goals but also as an instrument to 
enforce its foreign policy interests. The fact that it is unlikely that the 
European Energy Charta will be ratified anytime soon shows the limits of 
the EU-Russian energy dialogue. The EU-Russia special summit in Lahti 
2006 dealt with the sensitive subject of energy. At this summit, the EU 
again demanded for the ratification of the Energy Charta and guarantees for 
gas supply, and criticised actions against European investors, e. g. Royal 
Dutch Shell had been refused an exploitation license for oil fields and gas 
 
Working Document Nr. 166, 4-20. And see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p 
_574.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
35   Comparison using US Dollars in 2007. See http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/ 
p_574.htm last accessed on 21.08.2007. 
36  Goetz, R., 2002, Russlands Erdgas und die Energiesicherheit der EU, Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, 5–35. 
37  Belyi, A., 2003, New Dimensions of Energy Security of the enlarging EU and their 
impact on relations with Russia, in: European Integration 25 (4), 351-369. Dominic Heinz 
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reserves in Sakhalin. Furthermore, the EU raised the subject of the Russian 
blockade of ENP partner countries in the Caucasus. 
The essential bone of contention in the Caucasus as an area of cooperation 
is the status of Chechnya as a separate country. This status was established 
on 27 November 1990 when the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush 
Republic adopted a declaration on state sovereignty and tried to secede 
from the SU.  In 1991, the SU dissolved and in 1992 the Chechen Republic 
adopted its own constitution that foresaw parliamentary and presidential 
elections. After having existed for more than a year as sovereign state, ac-
cording to the Chechen perspective, Russia launched a war in 1994 against 
Chechnya that ended in 1996. In 1997, Chechnya held presidential und par-
liamentary elections with the support of the OSCE and was officially rec-
ognised by the Council of Europe which sent a large number of observers. 
On 12 May 1997, a peace treaty was signed that laid down the basic princi-
ples for relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Repub-
lic of Ichkeria. Chechnya regards this treaty as an international treaty 
between two independent entities, while Russia considers it as a treaty with 
one of its 32 subjects of the Federation. 
Russia’s position was twofold in the past. Firstly, Russia stressed that the 
split between Chechnya and Ingushetia shortly after the dissolution of the 
SU was illegitimate because the National Congress of the Chechen People 
and the Executive Committee around Dzhokhar Dudayev violently forced 
the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic to dissolve itself. 
Hence, as Chechnya continues to be a part of the Russian Federation, Rus-
sia   considered the Chechen conflict to be an inner Russian affair.  
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Russia’s position changed. 
Now Russia justifies its policy towards Chechnya as part of the fight 
against international terrorism. Either way, Russia still rejects the inde-
pendence of Chechnya because it was a part of the Russian Soviet Federa-
tive Republic (RSFR) and not a Union Republic like the Baltic (Estonia, 
etc.) and Central Asian (Turkmenistan, etc.) states, let alone a Peoples Re-
public (like Poland, etc.). A Review of EU-Russian Relations 
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Moreover, Russian official statements stress that, if Russia would grant 
Chechnya independence, the other 31 subjects of the federation would also 
try to attain independence. That resembles a situation like in the Former 
Yugoslavia where the parts of Yugoslavia and Serbia strived for independ-
ence that ended in the already mentioned conflict in Kosovo. In the area of 
cooperation in Foreign Policy and External Security the case of Kosovo 
showed that until the end of the 1990s, no functioning institutions nor poli-
cies were in place to mediate a conflict situation. The conflict in Kosovo 
was the impulse for setting up institutions like the regular EU-Russia sum-
mits. 
For Russia, NATO’s air strikes were an aggression against Serbia, while 
European states saw it as a humanitarian intervention. At the same time, 
Russia needed financial support in the framework of the double transforma-
tion process. And the same countries that Russia had criticized for the ac-
tions in Kosovo were the potential donors or had considerable political 
clout in the financial institutions that could provide financial support.
38 
This dilemma determined Russian foreign policy throughout the 1990s. On 
the one hand, it led to an emphasis on the primacy of the UN Security 
Council and to attempts to balance the actions of the western alliance by 
sidelining Russia’s opponents. At times, this meant acting only in short-
term Russian national interests.
39 Russia proved to be capable of influenc-
ing the policies of the western alliance for instance in Kosovo in 1999 by 
using its veto in the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, the result was that 
NATO actions were launched despite the veto of Russia. 
Thus, Russia remained isolated on the international stage.
40 1999 marked a 
turning point in the relations of Russia with the West and thus also with the 
EU. 
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Already in 1998, NATO enlargement had caused frictions in the partner-
ship. Dmitri Trenin argues that the year 1999, in which both the NATO op-
eration “Allied Force” in Kosovo and the war in Chechnya took place, was 
a double test for the relations of Russia with the West. The year would 
bring, according to Dmitri Trenin, either the end of a real partnership be-
tween Russia and the west or the basis for a sustainable partnership.
41 The 
frustrations that occurred due to the events in Chechnya and Kosovo had a 
deep impact on the way Russia tried to find a place in the post Cold War 
international order. The West’s criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya 
and only a short time earlier the “aggression of NATO against a sovereign 
state”, so the Russian reading, insulted  Russia’s  conception of itself as a 
great power.
42 
After the war in Kosovo, Russian relations with NATO were in tatters. The 
rapprochement of Russia and NATO was indicated by Vladimir Putin’s 
invitation of George Robertson, then NATO Secretary General, to Moscow 
in order to discuss questions concerning KFOR and SFOR. This meant the 
factual acceptance by Russia that NATO is the primary security organiza-
tion in Europe and continues to reform its role after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact.
43 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and Russia’s 
membership in the anti-terror coalition brought Russia closer to the US in 
particular and NATO in general.
44 Also, the war in Kosovo constituted a 
turning point with regard to Russia’s behaviour towards the OSCE. The 
war in Kosovo made obvious that the OSCE was not the institution that 
Russia expected it to be.  Russian criticism focused on what Russia per-
ceived as a narrowing of the OSCE’s functions and geographical zone of 
responsibility. That meant that Russia criticized the reduction of the 
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OSCE’s tasks to humanitarian and human rights issues, as Russia saw it. In 
addition, Russia criticised that the OSCE was mainly active in post Soviet 
territory and the Balkans although its geographical zone of responsibility 
stretched far beyond these areas. Furthermore, Russia criticized the OSCE 
operation in Chechnya.
45  
The UN Security Council was the centre of gravity for Russian great power 
ambitions, both before and after the Kosovo war. Before Kosovo, Russia 
used its veto to constrain NATO operations, because it feared that more 
out-of-area activities could undermine Russia’s interests. After Kosovo, 
Russia stressed three important points:  firstly, that the UN is an organiza-
tion to prevent hegemony and that Russia remains opposed to concepts like 
humanitarian interventions; secondly, that the five permanent members of 
the Security Council are the centre of the organization and every reform 
effort would have destabilizing effects; and thirdly, Russia stressed the role 
of the UN in the war on terror after 11 September 2001. 
Conclusion 
The paper shed light on the increasing relevance of the bilateral relations 
between Russia and the EU after the end of the Cold War. These relations 
were not only shaped by factors like the EU’s energy consumption and the 
emergence of conflicts in the Caucasus and the Balkans. A second, en-
dogenous, dimension also shaped the relationship. That dimension was the 
internal organization of the foreign policy formulating process both within 
the EU and Russia. Both actors had to build up new instruments and insti-
tutions. Russian state structures had collapsed after the dissolution of the 
SU, and there had been few instruments for foreign policy in the EU to be-
gin with. In addition, both actors experienced a transformation of their for-
eign policy during the last years. The Treaty of Maastricht codified the 
EU’s ambitions to wield soft power by recourse to civilian foreign policy 
instruments. Moreover, the EU successfully conducts police missions in the 
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Western Balkans and strengthens the military aspect of its foreign policy. 
Russia inherited a huge military industrial complex and a seat in the UN 
Security Council from the SU. More than 15 years after the dissolution of 
the SU, the military industrial complex is still huge and Russia still has the 
UN Security Council seat. But today, Russia primarily employs its energy 
resources as soft power tool to enforce its interests even in ENP partner 
countries like Ukraine. In this paper, three cases have been discussed. Con-
cerning the energy dialogue, EU institutions and policies, as distinct from 
national institutions and policies of the EU member states, have brought 
added value. The European need for a stable supply of gas and oil meets 
the Russian need for foreign direct investment into the Russian infrastruc-
ture,  especially so since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made the 
supply of energy from the Middle East insecure. On the other hand, the 
EU-Russian relationship could not provide solutions to the conflict in Kos-
ovo. Chechnya was another case of dissent for EU-Russian relations. While 
the EU accused Russia of violations against human rights, Russia accused 
the EU of interfering in domestic Russian affairs. However, in 2004 the 
situation changed, and Russia decided to allow European involvement in 
the reconstruction of Chechnya and other North Caucasian regions. Ac-
cordingly, closer ties between the EU and Russia have facilitated – if not 
the dissolution of dissent – the formulation of a viable approach to certain 
issues for both sides. Hence, despite its deficiencies, structured EU-Russia 
relations clearly display the potential to generate a more comprehensive 
and balanced relationship. 
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